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NLRB PERMITS FALSE CAMPAIGN
STATEMENTS IN UNION REPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS -SHOPPING KART FOOD MARKET, INC.
The First Amendment to the Constitution guarantees to all
employers and union representatives the right to communicate freely
to employees. 1 However, in labor relations, as in all other areas, the
right of free speech is not absolute. 2 It may be exercised only in a
manner which does not infringe upon the employees' "section 7
rights," under the National Labor Relations Act. 3  Any interference
with these statutory rights may constitute an unfair labor practice, 4
and may be sufficient grounds for setting aside a representation elec-
tion and ordering a new one. 5
1. The forms of general communication may include direct speech, speech through a third
party, usually an agent, and literature, either displayed or distributed to their workers. See
Fanning, Union Solicitation and Distribution of Literature on the Job-Balancing the Rights of
Employers and Employees, 9 GA. L. Rav. 367 (1975).
2. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); NLRB
v. Federbush Co., Inc., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941).
3. The NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Act] is
composed of four major acts: National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) 49 Stat. 449 (1935);
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 186 (1947);
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act), Pub. L. No. 257, 73
Stat. 541 (1959); and Public Law No. 93-360 (Health Care Amendments), 88 Stat. 395 (1974).
Section 7 of the Act provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection....
NLRA 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
4. An unfair labor practice is a violation of Section 8 of the Act. Very briefly, under Section
8(a), an employer may not:' (1) interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7, see note 3 supra; (2) dominate or interfere with the forma-
tion or administration of any labor organization, including financial or other support; (3) dis-
criminate with regard to hire, tenure, term or condition of employment to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization; (4) discriminate against an employee because he
has filed charges or given testimony under the Act; and (5) refuse to bargain collectively with
his employees' representatives. Under Section 8(b), a labor organization or its agents may not:
(1) restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights or an employer in his
selection of his collective bargaining representatives; (2) cause or attempt to cause an employer
to discriminate against an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3); (3) refuse to bargain collec-
tively with an employer; (4) engage in or induce a secondary boycott; (5) require an excessive or
discriminatory initial fee of employees; (6) extract from an employer money or thing of value for
services not to be performed; or (7) engage in illegal organizational picketing. NLRA 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (1970).
5. Section 9 provides for the designation or selection of representatives for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of employees in an appropriate unit. Id. § 159.
A petition for a representation election may be filed by a union, by employees, or by an
employer, with the Regional Office. If the Board finds upon investigation that a question of
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The problem of balancing an employer's or union representative's
right of free speech with the employees' section 7 rights arises consis-
tently throughout labor law. Since each party, union and employer, is
strongly desirous of soliciting votes, communication is especially im-
portant in the area of union representation elections.6 This desire to
communicate convincingly 7 causes the balancing of constitutional
and statutory rights to be precarious. To maintain the necessary bal-
ance of rights, the National Labor Relations Board 8 has adopted vari-
ous standards for employer and union campaign speech. 9 In Hol-
lywood Ceramics Co., 10 the Board established a standard of setting
representation exists, an election by secret ballot is ordered and the name of the selected rep-
resentative, or the lack thereof is certified. Objections to the election may be filed and conduct
which creates an atmosphere rendering a free choice by employees impossible will invalidate
the election. Objection may be filed within five days after the parties are furnished with the
tally of ballots. 41 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 46, 66 (1976).
6. A union may become the representative of the employees for the purposes of collective
bargaining by being selected by a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.
The NLRA does not require the parties to use the formal processes of the NLRB but does offer
them. An alternative method of receiving a bargaining order is an authorization by card-check,
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), if warranted by the commission of serious
unfair labor practices. See Note, Union Authorization Cards: Linden's Peacemaking Potential, 83
YALE L.J. 1689-1707 (1974).
7. On a theoretical level, the purpose of the campaign preceding such elections is to dis-
seminate as much information as possible to the employees so that they may make a well-in-
formed and well-reasoned choice of whether a specific union should represent them. On a
practical level, the purpose of the campaign is for either the employer or the union to convince
the employees that its side is "more right" than the other-i.e., to win. In their desire to
disseminate information in a light most favorable to their position, the parties may communicate
misleading or inaccurate representations.
8. Hereinafter referred to as the Board.
9. The major safeguards include: a requirement for preservation of laboratory conditions,
General Shoe Corp., discussed at notes 25-27 and accompanying text, infra; a list of employees'
names and addresses being made available by the employer to the union prior to the election,
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., discussed at notes 101-103 and accompanying text infra, a prohibi-
tion of captive audience speeches twenty-four hours prior to the election, Peerless Plywood Co.,
discussed at notes 104-106 and accompanying text, infra; a prohibition of electioneering at the
polls, Milchem Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968); and a standard that if one of the dominant ap-
peals of a campaign is to racial prejudice and bigotry, grounds for objections occur, Sewell Mfg.
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). See also Pollet, The National Labor Relations Board and Race
Hate Propaganda in Union Organization Drives, 17 STAN. L. REV. 373 (1965). For other elec-
tion safeguards, see Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under
The National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 38, 66-123 (1964).
10. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). The Hollywood Ceramics Co. rule essentially states that
where a substantial material misrepresentation of a vital fact is made which affects the outcome
of an election, the election will be set aside, and a rerun election will be ordered. The basic
policy underlying this rule was first established in Gummed Prod. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092
(1955), which stated that:
the ultimate consideration is whether [because of the challenged propaganda) ...
the uninhibited desires of the employees cannot be determined in an election.
Id. at 1094.
SHOPPING KART
aside elections on the grounds of material misrepresentations to
employees concerning a fact vital to election." Recently, in Shop-
ping Kart Food Market, Inc. ,12 however, the Board expressly over-
turned the twenty-two years of precedent generated by this standard
and its underlying policy. In that decision, the Board held that it no
longer would probe into the truth or falsity of the parties' campaign
statements. 13
FACTS OF Shopping Kart
During a meeting on the evening of June 19, 1974, the petitition-
ing union's 14 vice president and business representative told the as-
sembled employees that their employer had profits of $500,000 dur-
ing the past year. At the time, the union official made no attempt to
explain how he had arrived at this figure. The election was conducted
the next day and the union was selected as the employees' represen-
tative. Later developments revealed that profits were not $500,000
but were instead approximately $50,000.'1
The employer objected to conduct affecting the results of the elec-
tion and filed a complaint with the Board. The Regional Director
concluded that there had been a misrepresentation, but that it was
not material, 16 and proceeded to certify the union as the representa-
tive of the appropriate bargaining unit. On appeal, the unanimous
Board "7 affirmed the Regional Director's decision to certify the
union. The Board differed vehemently, however, concerning the
majority's decision to overrule Hollywood Ceramics. 18
11. Material misrepresentations appear in the labor law context as grounds for an objection
to conduct affecting the election, and not as grounds for an unfair labor practice. Hollywood
Ceramics, supra note 10.
12. 228 N.L.R.B. slip op. No. 190 at 1, 94 L.R.R.M. 1975 (1977).
13. id. at 3, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705.
14. The Retail Clerks Union Local 99, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO
(hereinafter the Union) is the party who petitioned for the election.
15. The facts of the case are found at 228 N.L.R.B. at 2, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705.
16. The Regional Director based his decision on the lack of evidence that the union rep-
resentative "either had or could reasonably be perceived to have had knowledge concerning the
employer's profits.'" Id.
17. The panel for this case was composed of all five members of the Board, thereby
acknowledging the importance of the issue. The Board is authorized to, and usually does, dele-
gate to a panel of three of its members any or all of its powers, including the hearing of appeals
from a Regional Director's decision. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1970).
18. The majority opinion was written by members Penello and Walther, with then-Chair-
person Murphy concurring. They held that the Hollywood Ceramics rule should be over-
turned. Therefore, there were no grounds for setting aside this election. 228 N.L.R.B. at 3, 94
L.R.R.M. at 1705. The minority's partial dissent was written by members Jenkins and Fanning,
with Jenkins dissenting further. They believed that under the Hollywood Ceramics standards,
1977]
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This Note will trace the development of Board law in the area of
misrepresentation to determine what themes the Board has em-
phasized. It will analyze the Board's decision in Shopping Kart and
the study of elections on which the Board strongly relied. In addition,
the Note will challenge the validity of this study and will criticize the
substantial shift in the Board's thinking. Finally, it will discuss the
potential impact of the Shopping Kart decision upon representation
elections and labor law in general.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MISREPRESENTATION LAW
In the early years of the Act, misrepresentations were not per-
ceived to be a problem because the Board required that employers 19
maintain a position of total neutrality regarding the question of
unionization.20 In 1941, the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Virginia
Power and Electric Co.21 eliminated this requirement; however, the
Court did recognize that the slight pressures exerted verbally by an
the employees did not consider the Union Representative to be a credible source for such
information. The employees also were capable of evaluating his remarks, given the small size of
the store and the known small profit margin of the industry. Id. at 14, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709.
19. There were no comparable restrictions placed on union speech because one of the prin-
ciple functions of the Board under the Wagner Act was the encouragement and promotion of
union organization. See Madden, Origin and Early Years of the National Labor Relations Act,
18 HASTINCS L.J. 571 (1967); Comment, Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and
Remedies in Representation Campaigns, 72 YALE L.J. 1243 (1963). See also Maywood Hosiery
Mills, Inc., 64 N.L.R.B. 146 (1945), in which the Board stated:
Absent violence, we have never undertaken to police union organization or union
campaigns, to weight the truth or falsehood of official union utterances, or to curb
the enthusiastic efforts of employee adherents to the union cause in winning others
to their convictions.
Id. at 150.
20. See, e.g., Schult Trailers, Inc., 28 N.L.R.B. 975 (1941); Ford Motor Company, 23
N.L.R.B. 342 (1940); Rockford Mitten and Hosiery Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 501 (1939); Southern
Colorado Power Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 699 (1939); The Triplett Elec. Instrument Co., 5
N.L.R.B. 835 (1938), for early examples of the Board's demand that employers remain totally
neutral. See also 3 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 59-62 (1938). In their annual report, the Board noted
that:
[i]n considering the effect of the employer's conduct . . . there must be borne in
mind the control wielded by employer over his employees-a control which results
from the employees' complete dependence upon their job s, generally their only
means of livelihood and economic existence. As the natural result of the employer's
economic power, employees are alertly responsive to the slightest suggestion of the
employer.
Id. at 125.
21. 314 U.S. 469 (1941). In Virginia Electric, an employer was accused of appealing to the
employees to bargain with the company directly and to form an inside bargaining committee.
The Board held such activities to be unfair labor practices. Although the Court remanded the
case, it indicated that neither the Act nor the Board's orders enjoined the employer from ex-
pressing his views on labor policies or problems.
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employer "may have a telling effect among men who know the con-
sequences of incurring that employer's strong displeasure." 2 2  Due to
the obligation to protect employees from the exercise of the
employer's superior economic power, the Court stated a policy of
balancing the freedom of the employer to speak against the right of
the employees to exercise free choice. Because the Board was slow in
its recognition of the new balancing standard, 23 Congress enacted as
part of the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947, section 8(c), also
known as the "Free Speech Proviso."-2 4  This placed a statutory duty
upon the Board to permit greater freedom of speech when deter-
mining whether violations of the Act have occurred. Soon after, the
Board adopted the General Shoe doctrine 25 which required the
maintenance of "laboratory conditions" 2 6 in all representation elec-
tions so that the "uninhibited desires of the employees" 27 could be
expressed. The adoption by the Board of this more restrictive stan-
dard for speech and conduct in representation elections has meant
22. Id. at 477.
23. See, e.g., Clark Bros. Co., Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946); Monumental Life Ins. Co., 69
N.L.R.B. 247 (1946). See also S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1947); NLRB v.
Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 66 L.R.R.M. 2769 (2d Cir. 1967). However, in marked contrast to
the board's position, the Court expanded the concept of free speech after Virginia Electric. See,
e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (holding a cluster of preferred freedoms was in-
volved in employer speech but especially the dissemination of ideas); Hague v. C.I.O., 307
U.S. 496 (1939) (holding that employer's right to discuss and inform people concerning unions is
protected by not only free speech but also by free assembly, while the employees' rights in-
cluded whether or not to listen). See generally speech by Board Chairperson Paul Herzog, to
the Annual Convention of the Industrial Relations Section of the Printing Industry of America,
in Atlantic City, N.J., 1946, reprinted in 18 L.R.R.M. 147 (1946).
24. Section 8(c) provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evi-
dence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970) (emphasis added). One apparent intent of Congress was to allow the
employer to make an anti-union but noncoercive speech or leaflet distribution which could not
then be treated as evidence of an unfair labor practice (hereinafter "ULP"), supra note 4. Previ-
ously, inferences from such speech had been made as to a motive for other employer conduct,
(for example, discharge) which would then arguably be a "ULP." Conversely, a prohibited mo-
tive may render speech that is non-violative on its face a ULP. R. GORMAN, BASIC LABOR LAW
TEXT 149-150 (1976).
25. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
26. Id. at 127. Regarding "laboratory conditions," the Board stated that:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which
an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to
determine the uninhibited desires of the employees. It is also our duty to deter-
mine whether they have been fulfilled.
Id. See also Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
27. 77 N.L.R.B. at 127.
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that objections to conduct affecting an election could be filed on a
much broader ground than available when filing an unfair labor prac-
tice. 28
In 1962, the Board firmly established its standard for setting aside
an election due to misrepresentations made by employers or union
representatives in the campaign. In Hollywood Ceramics,29 it said
that an election would be set aside
only where there has been misrepresentation or other similar cam-
paign trickery, which involves a substantial departure from the
truth, at a time which prevents the other party or parties from
making an effective reply, so that the misrepresentation, whether
deliberate or not, may reasonably be expected to have a significant
impact on the election. 30
The Board clearly stated that its basic policy underlying all rules in
this election field was to insure the employees full and complete
freedom of choice in selecting a bargaining representative. To achieve
this goal, the Board chose to maintain "laboratory conditions." In de-
ciding objections to elections based upon misrepresentations, the
Board again stated that it must balance the right of employees' free
choice against the right of the parties to wage a free and vigorous
campaign, as viewed within the totality of circumstances. 31
Until Shopping Kart, the courts and Board consistently have
applied the Hollywood Ceramics standard. 32 In addition, two of its
28. In order to maintain laboratory conditions, the Board also established that Section 8(c) is
to be limited to adversary proceedings of "ULPs," and not extended to representation election
cases. This resulted in a definite split of treatment by the Board. B. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON
LABOR LAw, 150-51 (1976). The motive behind "ULPs," whether involving 8(c) Free Speech or
not, is to control behavior; the remedy for violations is the traditional ULP remedies as appro-
priate, including posting of notices, reinstatement, back pay. The motive behind valid objec-
tions to elections is the maintenance of the purity of the Board's own election processes; the
remedy for such conduct is only the ordering of a rerun election. Because of the broader stan-
dard for setting aside an election, employer and union exercise of their right to free speech in
campaigns was not unrestricted, simply because it did not threaten or promise a benefit.
It is also worth noting that a decision of the Board sustaining objections, setting aside the
election, and ordering a new vote is not directly reviewable in the courts. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v.
NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 n.1 (2d Cir. 1952).
29. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). See note 10, supra.
30. Id. at 224. The Board expanded this in footnote 10 to include as one factor:
whether the party making the statement possesses intimate knowledge of the sub-
ject matter so that the employees sought to be persuaded may be expected to attach
added significance to its assertion.
Id. at 224 n. 10.
31. Id. at 223-24.
32. See, e.g., Bausch and Lomb, Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that a
statement by an employer that a local of the same union and employer, but in a different city,
gave up the employees' Christmas bonus without also indicating that they received something in
[Vol. 27:465
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major requirements, that of balancing the constitutional rights of
employer or union against the statutory rights of the employees, and
that of assessing any employer expression within the special context of
the labor relations setting, have been continuously reinforced. 33 As
recently as 1973, while meeting the periodic challenge to the Hol-
lywood Ceramics standard, the Board in Modine Manufacturing
Co. 34 declined to abandon the standard. Despite its acknowledge-
ment of the improved education of the voters, the wide familiarity of
Board-conducted elections, and the resulting increased sophistication
of employees, the Board stated:
[We are not yet ready to say that we will leave all our voters in all
of our elections and in all circumstances to sort out, with no pro-
tection from us, from among a barrage of flagrant deceptive mis-
representations. 35
However, within the next few years, two significant events
occurred. First, the composition of the Board changed. Member
Penello, who had clearly indicated his dissent to the Hollywood
return, was a material misrepresentation); NLRB v. Trancoa Chem. Corp., 303 F.2d 456 (lst
Cir. 1962) (holding that material misrepresentation existed where the union indicated wages and
benefits negotiated with a similar employer without indicating such would be effective only if
employer continued in special government work); Modine Mfg. Co., 203 N.L.R.B.
527 (1973) (upholding a Regional Director's decision that statements by the petitioner-union
were not material misrepresentations so that no new election was warranted); Grede Foundries,
Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 984 (1965) (holding that a union handbill distributed the day before the
election indicating an average take-home pay at a different employer where in fact only two of
350 employees received the average was a material misrepresentation).
33. See generally NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). In Gissel, the Court
stated that:
any balancing of those rights must take into account the economic dependence of
the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, be-
cause of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might
be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.
Id. at 647. See also NLRB v. Federbush Co. Inc., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941), in which Judge
Learned Hand stated:
Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition. . . . What to an outsider will be no
more than the vigorous presentation of a conviction, to an employee may be the
manifestation of a determination which it is not safe to thwart. The Board must
decide how far the second aspect obliterates the first.
Id. at 957. This showing of sensitivity may be characterized as realistic or as paternalistic.
Either way, the Court has instructed the Board to focus not only on what the speaker intended,
but also on what the listener understood.
34. 203 N.L.R.B. 527 (1973). The Board denied that the union is statutorily entitled to a
hearing on the issue of alleged misrepresentations since the existence of a tendency to mate-
rially mislead is a matter calling for the exercise of the Board's own administrative expertise and
common sense, rather than something which is susceptible to development through an eviden-
tiary hearing.
35. Id. at 530.
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Ceramics rule in Modine Manufacturing Co.,36 was joined by two
new members who agreed with him on this issue.3 7  Second, an em-
pirical study of union representation elections was published by Pro-
fessors Getman, Goldberg and Herman. 38  Shortly thereafter, the
Hollywood Ceramics rule was discarded.
ANALYSIS
Board's Reasoning in Shopping Kart
The Shopping Kart majority stated that over twenty years of ex-
perience had shown that the Hollywood Ceramics rule had impeded
free choice. 39  The Board further stated that administration of the
rule had led to: (1) extensive analysis of campaign propaganda; 4 0 (2)
restriction of free speech; 41 (3) variance in application between the
36. Id. at 530 n.6.
37. The two new members on the Board were Betty Murphy, who became chairperson, and
Peter Walther. For the new members' views, see Big D. Mining, 222 N.L.R.B. 522 (1976); The
Contract Knitter, Inc. 220 N.L.R.B. 579 (1975); Address before the Annual Midwest Labor Law
Conference, Reference Manual For Continuing Legal Education Program, Midwest Labor Law
Conference 1.01 (1976) (for Chairperson Murphy's views). See Masoneilan Int'l, Inc.,
223 N.L.R.B. 965 (1976) (for member Walther's views). See Erno Lewis, 217 N.L.R.B. 239
(1975); Medical Ancillary Servs., 212 N.L.R.B. 582 (1974) (for member Penello's early views on
the subject).
38. Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying N.L.R.B. Regulation of
Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REv. 263 (1976). Preced-
ing this was its companion article: Getman, Goldberg & Herman, N.L.R.B. Regulation of Cam-
paign Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions On Which the Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1465 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Getman/Goldberg studies]. These articles were later expanded
into a book, J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS:
LAW AND REALITY, (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Getman/
Goldberg Study].
39. The Board believed that it was first necessary to establish that the Board was clearly
authorized to make this change in Board policy. It specifically relied upon the language in the
recent Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) for the
authority. In Weingarten, the Court noted that the exercise of the Board's administrative discre-
tion in the decisionmaking process necessarily included the authority to revise or to modify
principles previously adopted.
40. 228 N.L.R.B. at 4, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1706. Possibly one real reason for this decision is the
Board's discomfort with the necessity of "brinkmanship" in analyzing campaign speech.
41. Id. Members Fanning and Jenkins in their partial dissent seem to imply that the free
speech concerns of the majority may be serving as an excuse rather than as a reason for the new
decision. Id. at 22, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1711-12.
The argument that free speech is to be afforded the same degree of protection in the labor
law area as it is afforded in other areas is without support. It is especially important that the
NLRB's application of law within the First Amendment area is in accord with Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). In Hudgens, the Supreme Court deferred to the Board's interpre-
tation of labor law regarding shopping center picketing, rather than relying upon traditional
First Amendment grounds. Thus, in effect, the Court was telling the Board to use its own
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Board and the courts; 42 (4) increased litigation; 43 and (5) a resulting
decrease in the finality of election results.4 4  Relying upon two
studies on the effects of the Hollywood Ceramics rule,4 5 the Board
majority concluded that these difficulties and the necessary subjectiv-
ity of the rule resulted in a norm that was difficult to administer. Yet
the Board stated that these were not the important reasons for their
decision to overrule Hollywood Ceramics.
The Board indicated that it would be willing to overlook these
problems if it felt that there was still a need to protect workers from
expertise in the labor arena when dealing with the area of free speech, instead of the relatively
unfamiliar constitutional law.
The recent case, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), which expanded free speech into the commercial speech area, does
not alter this conclusion. Although Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy may be interpreted as an
indication of the Supreme Court's interest in expanding free speech into all business and
economic areas, there is a fundamental difference between its application to prescription drug
prices and representation campaign speech. By permitting more free speech in advertising drug
prices, the consumer receives more truthful information on which to base his decision to buy.
In contrast, permitting more free speech in representation campaigns-to the extent of material
misrepresentations-may well result in the employee's hearing less 'truthful information.
42. Id. at 4, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1706. Members Fanning and Jenkins disagree with the major-
ity's concern with this variance since: (1) they read these decisions to reflect disagreement with
how strictly the Hollywood Ceramics rule should be applied, and not with the rule itself; and (2)
some variance between the Board and the courts is inevitable since their members are human
beings who will sometimes disagree with each other. Id. at 18 and 19, n.35, 94 L.R.R.M. at
1710. The relative inexperience in the labor law field among judges and their consequential
discomfort in deciding cases in this area of the law may be an additional cause of variance.
43. Id. at 4, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1706. Members Fanning and Jenkins believe that "losing par-
ties" do not object routinely to their opponent's campaign statements and that the few cases
considered on the misrepresentation issue are an "excellent investment in maintaining our elec-
tion standards." Id. at 17-18, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710. This belief is supported by figures obtained
from the Annual Statistics on the Conduct of Elections-Fiscal Year 1976. These figures indi-
cate that in the last six years the Board has considered some 250-450 misrepresentation cases
per year, out of over 10,000 elections conducted per year. Furthermore, rerun elections are
directed in only 25-27 elections per year because of objections sustained on this issue. De Sio,
Annual Statistics on the Conduct of Elections-Fiscal Year 1976, Office of the General Counsel,
Division of Operations Management, Memorandum 77-14, Feb. 11, 1977.
44. 228 N.L.R.B. at 4, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1706. Members Fanning and Jenkins do agree with
the majority that delay, particularly of election results, is a serious problem. However, it may
be "an unavoidable characteristic" of maintaining the necessary campaign standards. Id. at
18-20, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710-11. In Shopping Kart itself, the election was conducted June 20,
1974, and the decision had been before the Board since June 4, 1975. This especially long delay
before the Board may have been due to the fact that it was used as a vehicle for a reevaluation
of a major rule. Id. at 19, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710.
45. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under: the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 85 (1964). Bok expressed the opinion that no
standard of truth and accuracy could provide an administrable norm, and to insist on such gives
rise to "vague and inconsistent rulings which baffle the parties and provoke litigation." R.
WILLIAMS, P. JANUS & K. HUHN, NLRB REGULATIONS OF ELECTION CONDUCT 57 (1974).
The authors claimed that determinations regarding the substantiality and materiality of particu-
lar misrepresentations are necessarily highly subjective.
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campaign misrepresentations to insure their freedom of choice. How-
ever, the majority no longer perceived such a need. The Board re-
jected the perception of employees as naive, unworldly, and easily
swayed, considering the improved educational system and the fre-
quency of Board elections in the industrial world. 46  Relying almost
exclusively upon the recent empirical study by Professors Getman
and Goldberg, 47 the Board concluded that employees are now suffi-
ciently mature to recognize and discount campaign propaganda for
what it is. 48  Consequently, the Board no longer perceived a need for
the Hollywood Ceramics rule, and held that it would "no longer
probe into the truth or falsity of the parties' campaign statements." 49
The Getman/Goldberg Study
One of the major criticisms that Getman and Goldberg levelled at
Board policy-making is that policies are based upon statistically un-
verified behavioral assumptions. 50 This charge may be true, 51 and it
is healthy to reexamine periodically such premises as to current val-
idity. However, the appropriate response was not to decide that this
46. In fiscal year 1976, the Board conducted 8,027 collective bargaining elections, only
slightly more than the past few years, of which the unions won fifty percent. An additional 872
representation elections included inconclusive elections, decertification, union-shop deauthoriza-
tion and elections. 41 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 16-17 (1976).
47. Getman & Goldberg, supra note 38.
48. 228 N.L.R.B. at 8, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
49. Id. at 3, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705.
The majority did state that the Board would continue to set elections aside where a party has
engaged in deceptive campaign practices as improperly involving the Board and its processes, or
the use of forged documents which render the voters unable to recognize the propaganda for
what it is. Furthermore, this decision was limited to areas of misrepresentation, and allegedly
was not meant to affect Board intervention in other campaign conduct which interferes with
employee free choice (the traditional areas of threats, promises of benefits, surveillance, interro-
gation, and other unfair labor practices). id. at 9-10, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708. Murphy, then
Chairperson, stated in a concurring opinion, that her sole departure from the majority position
was that she additionally would set aside an election "where a party makes an egregious mistake
of fact ...in the most extreme situation." Id. at 11-12, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708. What constitutes
an extreme situation has yet to be determined.
50. See generally Raskin, Deregulation of Union Campaigns: Restoring the First Amendment
Balance, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1175 (1976).
51. The Board has assumed, for example, that an employee's vote will be influenced by: (1)
threats of reprisal, see, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-19 (1969); (2)
promises of benefit, see, e.g., NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co. 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964); (3) threat
of use of physical force or violence, see, e.g., Al Long, Inc. 173 N.L.R.B. 477 (1968); (4) polling
of employees by the employer, see, e.g., Struksnes Const. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967); (5)
surveillance of employees by the employer which implies possible future retaliation, see, e.g.,
Hendrix Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 100 (5th Cir., 1963); and (6) distribution of an official
ballot in such a way that suggests either directly or indirectly to the voters a preference of the
Board, see, e.g., Allied Elec. Prods., Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 1270 (1954).
1977] SHOPPING KART
one study had sufficient credibility on its face to overrule policy
choices based on many years of experience. In Shopping Kart, the
Board simply adopted, without critical evaluation, the Getman/
Goldberg study's conclusion that the voting habits of employees are
largely unaffected by election campaigns, as providing a "more accu-
rate model of employee behavior." 53 The lack of critical analysis 54 of
the study is especially significant since there are many criticisms of
the study which undermine the validity of its conclusions. 55
The Getman/Goldberg study consisted of data compiled from inter-
views with one thousand employees in thirty-one "hotly contested"
labor elections 56 in the Midwest. This data indicated that in eighty-
one percent of the cases, an employee's actual vote could be correctly
predicted from his intent three weeks prior to the election. Of the
nineteen percent whose vote could not be predicted, only five per-
cent of the nineteen percent arguably could have been affected by
any speech or action occurring during the campaign. 57 Professors
Getman and Goldberg concluded that the election campaign did not
have a significant impact on a voter's choice in the elections. 58 Ac-
cordingly, they proposed that discharges, other reprisals, grants of
52. See Roomkin & Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLRB Regulation: A Proposal,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1441 (1977). In this article, the authors propose the establishment in the
NLRB of a research unit capable of evaluating and generating behavioral evidence relevant to
the fashioning of labor standards, including the testing of validity of behavioral assumptions.
53. 228 N.L.R.B. at 8, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
54: Two commentators recently noted the importance of critical evaluation of behavioral
studies. They stated:
Indeed, it might be desirable to treat behavioral evidence with more suspicion than
other evidence. Since science progresses through the accumulation of data and
findings and the replication of results, there remains in any scientific venture a
significant risk that results will not withstand the discovery of a new investigative
technique or hold up under subsequent replications.
Roomkin & Abrams, supra note 52, at 1452.
55. The Getman/Goldberg study has been the subject of a recent symposium in 28 STAN. L.
REV. 1161 (1976). Commentators reviewed the study from the perspectives of the Board, man-
agement, labor, social science (methodology), and industrial relations. See also Goetz & Wike,
Book Review, 25 KAN. L. REV. 375 (1977); Kochan, Book Review, Legal Nonsense, Empirical
Examination and Policy Evaluation, 29 STAN. L. REV 1115 (1977).
56. A "hotly-contested election" is, by the authors' standards, one with high potential for
illegal behavior. Getman/Goldberg study, supra note 38, at 34. In these elections, two inter-
views were conducted with each employee. The first interviews took place within a three week
period prior to the election, and consisted of questions concerning the particular employee's
attitude towards unions and general working conditions and his voting intent. In the second
interview, which occurred after the election, employees were asked how they voted and why.
For a fuller discussion of the methodology, see Getman/Goldberg study at 33-51.
57. See notes 67-69 and accompanying test infra.
58. Getman/Goldberg study, supra note 38, at 120-21.
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benefits, threats, promises, interrogations, and misrepresentations
should be eliminated as grounds for setting aside elections.5 9
Criticism of the Internal Validity
of the Getman/Goldberg Study
The first obvious criticism of the study is that the reliability of the
conclusions must be discounted by the fact that the study itself was
limited to campaigns conducted in accordance with the Hollywood
Ceramics standard. 60 Although the authors attempted to avoid this
problem by only studying "hotly contested" elections, their conclu-
sion remains suspect because it is impossible to predict how many
more nisrepresentations or other election violations would have oc-
curred if the Hollywood Ceramics rule had not been in effect. 61 The
study's failure to account for the adherence to the legal limits by most
of the parties creates three distinct problems. An inherent bias to the
study arises which is impossible to remove. The resultant findings
inadequately gauge the deterrent effect which the Hollywood
Ceramics standard has on those parties who do not treat Board law
with contempt. This failure also creates a situation in which it is dif-
ficult to determine if the meritorious aspects of the rule will be dis-
carded with the obsolete.
The study also has been criticized for using skewed data. 62
Perhaps the sample of the representation elections used was not suffi-
ciently representative to support the conclusions. 63  The elections
59. Id. at 147-52.
60. 228 N.L.R.B. at 18, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710 (Fanning, J. and Jenkins, H., partially dis-
senting). These elections were also conducted in accordance with other election safeguards. See
note 9 supra.
61. But see Flanagan, The Behavioral Foundations of Union Election Regulation, 28 STAN.
L. REV. 1195, 1204-05 (1976). The author disagrees with the assumption that more misrepresen-
tations would have occurred without the Hollywood Ceramics rule. He feels that the current
NLRB and court remedy for such violations (setting aside the election and ordering a rerun of
the elections) is not a sufficient inducement for the regulation of misrepresentations. Employers
may consider it to be cheaper to bear the remedial costs than to follow the rule. This is par-
ticularly true in the case of a rerun of the election since unions tend to lose a high percentage of
the reruns. 41 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 234 (1976). Even though this perception may be true with
regards to the employer who is openly contemptuous of the law, it may not be true with
regards to the employer who is obedient to existing law. Flanagan fails to realize that the main
value of the Hollywood Ceramics rule may well lie in its ability to deter essentially law-abiding
employers from indulging in material misrepresentations.
62. Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study from a Trade-Unionist's Point of View,
28 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 1182-85 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Eames].
63. A representative sampling plan insures that the odds are great enough that the selected
sample is, for the purposes at hand, sufficiently representative of the population to justify run-
ning the risk of taking it as representative. Probability sampling, rather than accidental or quota
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studied were limited to a geographical area in Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Missouri and Iowa. This fact suggests that the conclusions may
not be applicable to other regions, especially the South, where union
representation is the smallest of any other region. Additionally, 45%
of the N.L.R.B. elections studied were conducted in units of more
than one hundred employees, even though only 13% of all N.L.R.B.
elections were in units of this size. 64 Although this may have had
administrative benefits for the study, it is not unreasonable to ques-
tion whether employees in large units are inevitably more familiar
with representation elections, thus creating an additional subtle bias
in the study. In addition, of the 31 elections studied, the union won
eight, or 26%, in contrast to the national average of 50% won by
unions in the past several years.
The study also has been attacked for its failure to use a control
group.65 As noted, the study included interviews of employees who
were in the midst of "hotly contested" elections, often including elec-
tions in which the employer had exhibited a coercive pattern prior to
the campaign. No attempt was made to study any control group of
employees who were not subjected to coercion and unfair labor prac-
tices. As a result, the study did not indicate what the norm was for
employee response and thus could not show how its findings differed
from that norm.
Finally, the data in the study was collected in the very limited time
frame 66 of three weeks before the election and for a short period
sampling, is the only approach which makes this possible and involves insurance against mis-
leading results. A. SELLTIZ, R. JAHODA, C. DEUTSCH, & J. COOK, RESEARCH METHODS IN
SOCIAL RELATIONS 509-21 (1959). That the elections studied were limited to a geographical area
and consisted of especially large units raises the question of whether this is a sufficiently pure
probability sampling. Fanning and Jenkins in their partial dissent also doubt that the thirty-one
elections constitute a statistically significant sample. 228 N.L.R.B. at 18, 94 N.L.R.B. at 1710.
64. This sample was selected in order to get a statistically stable estimate of campaign im-
pact. Getman/Goldberg study, supra note 38 at 35.
65. Eames, supra note 62, at 1182-85. A control group is one which is not exposed to the
assumed causal (or independent) variable. The use of a control group enables the tester to (1)
rule out other factors as possible determining conditions; (2) determine that the assumed effect
did not occur before the assumed cause; and (3) establish the existence of a concomitant or
associated variation vetween the causal and the dependent variable. While a "before-after" de-
sign (as used in the Getman/Goldberg study) may act as its own control group, it may also
hamper a determination of the interaction of prior or external events on the dependent variable,
thus clouding the study. A. SELLTIZ, R. JAHODA, C. DEUTSCH & J. COOK, RESEARCH
METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 94-95, 114-18 (1959).
66. Eames, supra note 62, at 1182-85. The purpose of studying the antecedent variable
(coercion and propaganda prior to the first interview) is to trace out a causal sequence and
thereby to clarify the influences on the relationship between the independent variable (as mea-
sured in the first interview) and the dependent variable (the vote as measured in the second
interview). See J. ROSENBERG, THE LOGIC OF SURVEY ANALYSIS 66-68 (1968).
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after the election. No attempt was made to conduct interviews earlier
in the campaign when coercion and propaganda easily might have
occurred resulting in a polarization of pro- or anti-union sentiment.
When Getman and Goldberg began their study three weeks prior to
the election, campaigns already may have hardened employee's
views.
Another criticism of the Getman/Goldberg study is its failure to
analyze and explain one of its key findings, that five percent of the
voters did change their minds due to the campaign. 67 This five per-
cent could have been subjected to exceptionally well-run campaigns 68
or could have participated in elections in which fewer election
safeguards were violated. The important deductions from this statistic
are that something caused the voters to change their minds and that
some elections are more successful than others in causing such a
change. 69 The study fails to determine what variables are responsi-
ble.
A final ground for criticism involves the adequacy of support for
some of the study's other conclusions. For example, Board member
Jenkins expressed doubt over the support for the conclusions that
employees were unaffected by employer's unlawful campaigning, dis-
criminatory discharges, and interrogations 70 in view of the fact that
the employees were never asked whether these factors affected their
votes. Instead, the first two of these conclusions were based on data
which indicated that initial union supporters did not report a higher
percentage of unlawful employee campaigning or employee dis-
charges. 71 The conclusion that employees were unaffected by inter-
rogation was based on findings that it "was rarely reported by
67. 228 N.L.R.B. at 16, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710. Fanning and Jenkins in their partial dissent
express their view that this five percent is not insignificant.
68. Former Board Chairperson Miller finds that many nuances escaped the attention of the
authors which do not escape any skilled industrial campaigner, and faults the authors for not
looking further to determine the characteristics which distinguish a successful employer or
union campaign. Miller concludes that the study supports his experiential belief that campaigns
can be highly successful, although few are. But the authors ignored the good possibility that
they may have unconsciously chosen poorly run campaigns, which thereby would bias their
responses and their conclusions. Miller, The Getman, Goldberg and Hernman Questions, 28
STAN L. REV. 1163, 1166 (1966).
69. In the campaigns which the authors characterize as "most successful company cam-
paigns," the union lost thirty-five percent of its card signers by the time of voting as compared
to an average of four percent in typical campaigns. In "successful union campaigns," it gained
ten percent between signing and voting as compared to the same average of four percent. These
variances alone must indicate that campaign techniques, whether legal or illegal, do make a
difference. Eames, supra note 62, at 1186.
70. 228 N.L.R.B. at 24-26, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1712 (Jenkins, H., further dissent).
71. The Getman/Goldberg Study, supra note 38, at 121, 126.
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employers as a campaign tactic." 72  The failure to report these ac-
tivities does not support the conclusion that these tactics do not influ-
ence the employee's vote.
These criticisms suggest certain internal problems with the study
and its conclusions which should have required a more thorough
evaluation of this study prior to its unquestioned adoption by the
Board. Instead, the Board appears to have incorporated without cor-
rection not only these internal deficiencies, but also certain external
deficiencies not even fathomed by the study. By its decision the
Board manifested a change in attitude towards employees while fail-
ing to consider the realities of the labor relations setting and the
many purposes served by the Hollywood Ceramics rule.
Criticisms of the External Deficiencies of the
Board's Decision and the Getman/Goldberg Conclusions
As a result of the findings and conclusions made by the Getman/
Goldberg study, the Shopping Kart Board did more than simply
state that it will no longer probe into the truth or falsity of parties' cam-
paign statements; it totally changed its attitude toward employees. 73
Prior to Shopping Kart, the Board was almost paternalistic in its
attitude toward employees in the election campaign setting. 74
Employees were considered to be inherently in need of protection
against a superior opponent to insure freedom of choice, and so were
provided with various election safeguards. 75 With Shopping Kart,
the Board's attitude has shifted to one of parental pride that
employees are so sophisticated that they can see through almost any
misrepresentation made during a campaign. 76 Thus, because of this
new attitude, not only has one of the traditional election safeguards
been removed, but it is unpredictable how many more will be dis-
carded for the same reason. 77
72. Id. at 149.
73. 228 N.L.R.B. at 7-8, 11, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707, 1708.
74. The court stated in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969), that two
premises have been central to the Board's paternalism toward employees' rights. First, the
employee-employer relationship inherently retards the free exercise of employee rights.
Employment security, being foremost in the minds of the employees, has priority over any
desire to support unions. Second, employees do not interpret management statements objec-
tively, but infer the meaning having the greatest impact on their employment security, thus
foreclosing the effectiveness of union rebuttal. See also Swift, NLRB Overkill: Predictions of
Plant Relocation and Closure and Employer Free Speech, 8 GA. L. REv. 77, 91-96 (1973).
75. See note 9 supra.
76. See note 49 supra.
77. See notes 100-106 and accompanying text infra.
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This change in attitude, however, is inappropriate because it ig-
nores certain realities of the present national labor relations setting.
First, the decision ignores the heterogeneous nature of the workers
being organized. A significant number of employees being organized
speak little or no English. Many workers are minors in the sixteen to
twenty-one age bracket with very limited exposure to the industrial
world.78 Perhaps most significantly, for the first time in recent his-
tory the average new union member's level of educational attainment
is below that of the average American. 79  To assume that the im-
proved educational processes and increased familiarity of industrial
elections 80 justifies the removal of the Hollywood Ceramics rule is to
deny the presence of these characteristics of the labor force.
Second, the decision ignores the basic fact that today's employees,
when organizing, rarely if ever stand on an equal footing with their
employer.81 Today's high unemployment rate and job uncertainty
only exacerbates this problem. The well publicized scarcity of jobs is
inevitably on the minds of the employees when they listen to
employer speeches. Yet the Board now assumes that the employee is
sufficiently "sophisticated" to invariably listen to campaigns with the
objective ear of an impartial and knowledgeable third party. This
theory breaks with Board precedent that the listener/employee uses a
highly subjective "well-tuned ear" to listen to whatever is said by
either party who does affect or may affect his livelihood 8 2 and cer-
78. As of September, 1977, there were 14,452,300 people aged sixteen to twenty-one years
in the civilian labor force. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Volume 24, No. 10,
pgs. 21-22 (October 1977). The impact which people in this age bracket might have on union
elections is manifested by the results of the election in Shopping Kart. Petitioner union won the
election by a 14-8 vote. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1 n.2, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1975. The attorney for the
employer stated in his Motion for Reconsideration that at least four of the six high school
student employees voted for the union. He argued that "no study, doctor, expert or law review
article will ever be found to uphold the premise that high school students . . . from an
economically depressed area" are mature, experienced adults. Motion for Reconsideration of
Shopping Kart Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. slip op. No. 190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1975, at 2 (1977).
79. Although the educational attainment level of the average worker in the labor force con-
tinues to rise, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, March, 1977, 62-65, it is significant to note that one
recent study indicates that the educational attainment level of union members is on the decline.
Wall Street Journal, Oct. 5, 1977 at 22. In that study, Professor Drucker attributes this decline
to the fact that the more educated members of society are entering non-unionized "white collar"
professions, thus leaving only a pool of less educated workers for the traditionally unionized
occupations. This specifically contradicts one of the majority's premises. 228 N.L.R.B. at 7, 94
L.R.R.M. at 1707.
80. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 22 & 74 and accompanying text supra. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYS-
TEM OF FREE ExPREssION, 9-10, 676 (1970).
82. See N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
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tainly represents an unsophisticated analysis of the labor relations set-
ting.
Third, and particularly relevant to the election campaign context,
the decision ignores the increased sophistication of the various elec-
tioneering techniques used.8 3 As in political election campaigns, the
potential voter is subjected to an enormous variety of ever-improving
methods of communication designed to capture his vote. In the
political election context, recent legislation regulating campaigns" a
provides more opportunities for opposing parties to clear up any
misrepresentations which might occur. In contrast, the Board's over-
ruling of Hollywood Ceramics reduces regulation of labor election
campaigns and eliminates a procedure for rectifying misrepresenta-
tions.8 5 Thus, the employee who may be less educated, younger,
and speak English less fluently than the average American, who is on
an unequal footing with his opponent, and who is being subjected to
just as sophisticated electioneering, may be afforded less protection
than his counterpart voter in the political election setting.8 6
In changing its attitude toward employees, the Board did more
than slight these realities of the national labor relations setting. The
Shopping Kart Board appears to have adopted the reasoning that if
one purpose of a rule is in serious question, the rule must be dis-
83. See Miller, supra note 68, at 1164.
84. See, e.g., Freedman & Edelstein, Political Campaigning and the Airways, 1 PEPPER-
DINE L. REV. 178 (1974); Hollihan, The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974:
The Constitutionality of Limiting Political Advertising By the Non-Candidate, 3 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 226 (1975); Seeger, Free Speech and Political Contributions, 50 CONN. B.J. 33 (1976);
Simmons, The F.C.C.'s Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules Reconsidered, 125 U. PA.
L. REv. 990 (1977); Wick, The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and Political Broadcast
Reform, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 582 (1973).
85. In a speech delivered to the Labor Relations Law Section of the A.B.A., Professor
Goldberg, one of the authors of the Getman/Goldberg study, stated that the government's role
in union representation elections should be limited to merely conducting the election and
counting the ballots. Speech by Stephen Goldberg before the Labor Relations Law Section of
the American Bar Associoation in Chicago, Illinois, 1977, reprinted in 95 L.R.R.M. 390 (1977).
However, former Board Chairperson Edward Miller disagrees with this view. He feels that
reduction of the Board's standards to those used in political elections is neither warranted nor
desirable. Miller, supra note 68.
86. It is worth noting that the Board's attitude of voter sophistication, resulting in less pro-
tection, is directly contrary to recent legal trends in other segments of society. The new political
candidate disclosure laws (Federal Election Campaign Act, Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. 1225)
commercial speech (Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), see note 41, supra; attorney advertisements, (Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977)); and the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)) are
examples of consumer laws which have all acknowledged the increasing need and demands of




carded, thereby eliminating all other purposes served by the rule.8 7
The Getman/Goldberg study concluded that campaign misrepresenta-
tions do not affect the free choice of the employees, for generally the
employee decision is made prior to the campaign. Yet, neither the
study nor the Board considered that the Hollywood Ceramics rule
also served as a deterrent and as a necessary part of several of the
Board's statutorily delegated duties.
The results of the study do not and cannot calculate the obvious
deterrent effect that the Hollywood Ceramics rule had on campaign
misrepresentations. 88  Labor relations is an intensely practical field,
with both employer and union desirous of winning an election, 89 and
with people's livelihoods resting on the results of elections and con-
sequential collective bargaining agreements. It is likely that the im-
plementation of the Getman/Goldberg conclusions could result in an
increase in severe misrepresentations. 90
A second purpose ignored by the study, and hence by the Board, is
that the Hollywood Ceramics rule served as an implementation of
several of the Board's statutorily delegated duties. A primary task of
the Board is conducting elections and maintaining the integrity of
election processes in such a manner that they achieve and maintain
acceptability in the industrial relations community. 91 This is neces-
sary for the preservation of industrial peace and for the acceptance of
a chosen bargaining representative at the negotiation table. By refus-
ing to probe the truth or falsity of essentially all campaign statements
by any party, the Board is encouraging an almost "anything goes"
atmosphere in which irresponsible statements, or worse, will tend to
become commonplace. 92  Without reasonable limitations or a sincere
87. One purpose not well-served by the old rule was administrative efficiency. Indeed, the
Board's real reason for this decision may have been its deep-felt desire to eliminate the time
and effort necessitated by investigations and hearings on the issue of material misrepresenta-
tions. Unpublished statistics compiled by the Board in 1974 and 1976.
88. See Miller, supra note 68, at 1170-71. Miller states that people, including himself, who
are directly involved in counseling people who are facing campaigns, know of the deterrent
effect because their clients seek and follow their advice as to what may or may not be done,
despite the time, effort and money involved. Id. at 1170.
89. Technically, a union either wins or loses an election to represent the employees, but an
employer merely waits to bargain collectively with the winning union or other bargaining rep-
resentative, should there be one. See Section 1 of NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
90. 228 N.L.R.B. at 18, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710 (Fanning, J. and Jenkins, H. partially dis-
senting). There does exist one deterrent factor to a potential increase in misrepresentations: the
obvious lie will not be believed and may easily rebound against the speaker.
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, § 159 (1970). See Modine Mfg. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 527, 529 (1973).
92. 228 N.L.R.B. at 18, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710 (Fanning, J. and Jenkins, H. partially dis-
senting). See also Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966). Justice
Clark, in Linn, recognized that representation campaigns are heated affairs "characterized by
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show of concern by the Board, a general insolence towards the elec-
tion processes likely may develop among all parties. This is clearly
contrary to the Board's statutory duty and will defeat the necessary
integrity of the election processes.
Additionally, the Board has a statutory duty to encourage the
maintenance of stable bargaining relationships. 93 Collective bar-
gaining has assumed a central role in the labor relations setting.94
Because the negotiation process establishes the basic working re-
lationships between employer and employees, it is important that the
bargaining relationship be conducted in an atmosphere of trust and
good faith. 95 Such a difficult requirement would be complicated if
the parties bargaining originally had met in a campaign accompanied
by irresponsible statements. This easily could aggravate the feelings
of hesitancy and defensiveness which a party often brings to the bar-
gaining table, and ultimately could lead to increased distrust and sus-
picion towards one's opponent. Irresponsible statements may be de-
terred by this consideration alone. However, if they are not, such a
state of affairs will not lead to industrial peace, but, instead, could
lead to the industrial strife which the Board has tried to prevent ever
since the Act was formulated.
Finally, the rule served the Board's purpose of assuring that
employees have complete freedom of choice in selecting a bargaining
representative. The Board's withdrawal from protecting the em-
ployees against misrepresentations will alter the balance between the
rights of the employees and the employer's and union's valid rights to
free speech, 96 and will affect the Board and the parties' effort to as-
sure employees their right to freedom of choice. This is clearly con-
trary to the stated policy of providing both the employees and the
public free, fair and informed representation elections. 97 To permit
bitter and extreme charges, counter-charges, unfounded rumors, vituperations, personal accusa-
tions, misrepresentations and distortions." Id. at 58.
93. See 29 U.S.C. §, 151 (1970) (stating that the policy of the United States is to encourage
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining).
94. See Brooks, Stability Versus Employee Free Choice, 61 CORNELL L.J. 344 (1976); Ad-
dress by Gerald Brown, Recent Trends in N.L.R.B. Decisions, Feb. 1, 1963, cited in Fuchs,
Pre-Election Campaign Propaganda and Activities Before the National Labor Relations Board, 4
B.C. IND. AND COMM. L. REV. 485 (1963).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) (stating "to bargain collectively is tle performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to . . . confer in
good faith").
96. 228 N.L.R.B. at 22, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1711-12. See note 41 supra.
97. See Bausch and Lomb Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 873 (2d. Cir. 1971) (holding that the
minimal chilling effect on both the speech of the employer and the union presented by the
sanction of setting aside an election because of misrepresentation was justified).
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such a change in policy requires more than the support of a single
study.98
IMPACT OF Shopping Kart
The impact of the Shopping Kart decision may be more extensive
than is readily apparent. 99 Although the decision is limited specifi-
cally to the area of misrepresentations,'" 0 its rationale conceivably
could be extended to other election safeguards. For example, under
the Excelsior rule, 101 an employer is required to file with the Reg-
ional Director the names and addresses of all employees eligible to
vote within seven days of the direction of election or approval of the
election agreement. The lists usually are made available to the peti-
tioning union(s) ten to twenty-three days before the election in order
to permit the union to campaign among the employees and to insure
a free and reasoned choice. If, as the study suggests, nearly all
employees have a firm vote preference at the time of the direction of
election 102 or at least three weeks prior to the election, then the
need for these lists is somewhat questionable. If the study's conclu-
sion does not call for the elimination of the Excelsior rule, it certainly
suggests that the proper time to make the lists available is as soon as
a valid petition is filed.' 03
98. See note 41 supra regarding the effect of Hudgens.
99. The potential effect of Shopping Kart is especially unclear at this point for two reasons.
First, Board member Walther has resigned, and President Carter has nominated John Trues-
dale, former Executive Secretary of NLRB, as his replacement. Since Walther tended to be a
conservative member, and had been actively inviting a case to challenge Hollywood Ceramics,
the appointment of new member Truesdale may affect the future of the Shopping Kart decision.
At this point, no indications of member Truesdale's opinion are available. Second, since then
Chairperson Murphy's concurring opinion was quite unclear regarding her "egregious mistake cf
fact" standard, see note 49 supra, opportunity for leeway in interpretation of the decision does
exist.
100. Compare Penello's and Walther's statement that the Board will continue its policy of
overseeing other campaign conduct outside of misrepresentations, 228 N.L.R.B. at 10, 94
L.R.R.M. at 1708, with Jenkin's and Fanning's belief that this may be the first step in dispens-
ing with time-honored election safeguards, Id. at 22, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1711.
101. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). The Excelsior rule was estab-
lished by the Board in order to give labor organization an opportunity to explain their point of
view to the employees. Under the existing circumstances at the time of the decision, an
employer had many more opportunities to address the employees. An employer had both a list
of the names and addresses of his employees and a continuing opportunity to address the
employees on his work premises. The labor organizations had no such equal opportunities. See
generally Fanning, Union Solicitation and Distribution of Literature on the Job -Balancing the
Rights of Employers and Employees, 9 GA L. REV. 367 (1975).
102. Getman and Goldberg state that of the 94% of the employees having a vote preference
for the employer and the 82% for the union at the time of the first interview, 87% of those
employees voted as they had intended. Supra note 38 at 64.
103. The original rationale for the Excelsior rule, see note 101 supra, may be removed since
the proposed Labor Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(1)(A) (1977),
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Another election safeguard which may be affected by the Shopping
Kart rationale is the Peerless Plywood rule 104 that an election may be
set aside if either the employer or the union delivers captive audi-
ence speeches within twenty-four hours of the election. If campaign-
ing during the last three weeks before an election is virtually worth-
less, 10 5 then the Peerless Plywood rule also would appear to be
worthless. 106
Aside from the procedural aspects of the election, the Shopping
Kart decision may have a grave impact on voter turnout. At present,
voter turnout in labor elections is at an all-time high; it approaches
ninety percent, in marked contrast with a much lower figure in politi-
cal elections. 10 7  One reasonable assumption is that the lower voter
turn-out in political elections is caused by the voter's inability to rely
on representations made by candidates where there is no satisfactory
system of deterrence. 108 With the Board's refusing to examine for
misrepresentations, it is reasonable to foresee that voter skepticism
and lower expectations of honesty may carry over from political elec-
tions to representation elections.
The Shopping Kart decision also may have an effect outside of the
election area. For example, the Board could begin applying a stricter
standard in determining what factual situations would constitute un-
fair labor practice violations of section 8(a)(1), 10 9 which prohibits
requires that if an employer addresses employees on its premises or during working time on
representation issues, employees shall be assured an equal opportunity to obtain in an equiva-
lent manner information from the union. (The bill was passed by the House of Representatives
on Oct. 6, 1977).
104. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
105. Getman/Goldberg study supra note 38, at 146.
106. This change may be doubtful in view of a post-Shopping Kart decision, Rodac Corp.,
231 N.L.R.B. No. 29, 95 L.R.R.M. 1608 (Aug. 9, 1977), (holding for strict enforcement of the
Peerless Plywood rule), but this was a Fanning-Jenkins majority decision, and a full five-person
panel has yet to decide the issue.
Another election safeguard which may be affected by the Shopping Kart decision is the rule
against campaign appeals to racial prejudice and bigotry. Sewell Mfg. Co., supra note 9. Be-
cause of the Board's change in attitude toward voters, it may now be that employees are suffi-
ciently sophisticated to ignore the emotional and irrational appeal of racial slurs and epithets.
However, it does appear that the Milchemn rule, supra note 9, is not in danger of being mod-
ified. The Shopping Kart Board noted that grounds for objections would be preserved if the
Board's election processes are deceptively used. 228 N.L.R.B. at 9. Since electioneering at the
polls may be considered to be deceptive use of the Board's election processes, this objection
might remain unaffected by the Shopping Kart decision.
107. 228 N.L.R.B. at 20, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1711 (Fanning, J. and Jenkins, H., partially dis-
senting).
108. Id.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). An example may be that the granting of bonuses just prior
to an election arguably could be "ignored" by a "sophisticated employee". This would be in
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employer interference, restraint or coercion of employees in the exer-
cise of their section 7 rights. 110 Such a standard would require more
flagrant coercion and outright deception before the Board would find
that an unfair labor practice had occurred."' If, as alleged by the
Board, employees are sufficiently sophisticated to view impartially
what is said, 1 2 the Board's test may become the more objective
"reasonably prudent person on the street." This would be an unfair
substitute for the standard of the reasonable employee with his "ear
well-tuned" to coercive innuendoes. Such a view would result in not
only fewer findings of objectionable campaign conduct, but also fewer
findings of unfair labor practices and fewer bargaining orders. Con-
sequently, tougher campaigns would be waged by all parties. 113
opposition to N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (holding that employees are
not likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now being granted may be a "fist
inside the velvet glove.") A second example is when the employer conveys a sense of futility of
selecting a bargaining representative. Arguably, this could also be "ignored." See, e.g., The
Trane Co. 137 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1962) (holding a violation occurred when the employer explained
that his wage policies would continue to be determined unilaterally "union or no union"); Me-
tropolitan Life Ins. Co., 53 L.R.R.M. 1187 (1963) (holding a violation occurred when the
employer stated that he would abide by his present policies "even if Jesus Christ were repre-
senting the employees"). A third example is the current safeguards required to be observed by
an attorney when interrogating employees as necessary preparation for his defense for a pending
trial. These safeguards may be minimized due to the notion that "sophisticated" employee will
not feel coerced. Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 770 (1964).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1) (1970).
111. Supra note 85. Professor Goldberg recommends that election results should stand re-
gardless of whether the employer grants benefits or takes reprisals during the campaign. How-
ever, he would preserve the right to file unfair labor practice charges, based on such conduct,
under § 8(a)(1) and (3). See generally Swift, N.L.R.B. Overkill: Predictions of Plant Relocation
and Closure and Employer Free Speech, 8 GA. L. REV. 77-100 (1973), in which the author
suggests that the Board and the courts should take a less restrictive view towards 8(a)(1) viola-
tions in the representation election context.
112. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
113. Two areas of impact exist outside the Labor Board itself. The first is in the new fields of
labor relations in the public sector and in state agricultural labor boards. See California Agricul-
tural Labor Relations Act of 1975, CAL. LABOR CODE § 1140-116 (West Supp. 1976); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. §§ 23-1381 to 1395 (1972, Supp. 1975); Idaho Code § 22-1401 to 4113 (1972,
Supp. 1975); Kan. Stat. § 44-818 to 830 (1973). The Board's reliance of the Get-
man/Goldberg study and its questioning of behavioral assumptions may result in the discour-
agement of what has been thus far the the uncritical importation of N.L.R.B. decisions and rule
making into their own law. See Flanagan, The Behavioral Foundations of Union Election Regu-
lation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1195 (1976).
The second area of impact is in the area of civil law. Since remedy from the Board for
misrepresentations is now denied, civil lawsuits for misrepresentation and detrimental reliance
may increase as an alternative. That this is a possibility was acknowledged in Linn v. Plant
Guards, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65 (1966). However, the Court held that the standards for a
defamation suit by either union or employer are to be those enunciated in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which require stricter standards to establish a cause of action.
The Court stated that the requiring of a higher standard to establish a cause of action was to
discourage the use of civil law suits as weapons of economic coercion.
SHOPPING KART
A final area of impact involves the Board's policy making proce-
dures. The Shopping Kart Board's decision to rely upon the Get-
man/Goldberg study raises the question of whether exclusive reliance
upon. one empirical study is to become acceptable precedent. 114
While the increasing influence of behavioral sciences and technology
in our legal system 115 may be beneficial, slavish adherence to predic-
tions of how people will behave should not completely replace ex-
perience and common sense. Although the task of establishing rules
would be easier if one could rely on simple formulas or statistical
computations, as NLRB member Brown stated just prior to Hol-
lywood Ceramics,
[c]onvenient results are not always appropriate ones. Indeed, they
rarely are in the field of labor relations because of the different
factual circumstances, relationships between parties, variations be-
tween industries and plants within industries, and the continually
changing econonic climate." 6
Increased efficiency, lighter case loads, and less conflict with the
Courts which may in fact result from the discarding of the Hollywood
Ceramics rule are clearly desirable. However, the Board must not
ignore its primary duty of viably protecting employees' section 7
rights. Complete reliance upon an uncritically evaluated study cannot
viably protect these rights.
CONCLUSION
In the interests of protecting the employees' rights, the integrity of
the Board's election processes and the stability of the collective bar-
gaining processes, the Board must return to an evaluation of cam-
paign statements made by both the employer and the union. A new
standard should be adopted which not only acknowledges but also
emphasizes that: (1) the misrepresentation must be quite substantial;
and (2) the particular level of sophistication among the employees
who are voting must be a factor in determining the substantiality of
misrepresentations. 1 7  The many exceptions to the presumed high
114. See Roomkin & Abrams, supra note 52.
115. See Dworkin & DeNisi, Empirical Research on Labor Relations Law: A Review, Some
Problems, and Some Directions for Future Research, 28 LABOR L.J. 563 (1977).
116. Address by N.L.R.B. member Gerald A. Brown before the Labor Law Section of the
State Bar of Texas in San Antonio, Texas, on July 5, 1962, reprinted in 50 L.R.R.M. 72 (1962).
117. The level of sophistication was already a part of the Hollywood Ceramics rule, but has
not been sufficiently emphasized or acknowledged.
[W]e may for example take into account the current degree of sophistication of the
voters at a particular time or in a particular area as one of many intangibles going
into a determination of whether a rerun or hearing is justified.
Modine Mfg. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. at 531.
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level of sophistication of employees requires that if the particular
employees realistically need protection in order to make their desires
known through the election, such protection must be given by the
Board. 118
In the alternative, if Shopping Kart is allowed to stand, both the
effects of the decision and the accuracy of the conclusions of the
Getman/Goldberg study should be evaluated to determine whether
the desired results are accomplished in the marketplace. Whatever
the results of this evaluation, the Board in the future should be reluc-
tant to accept such empirical behavioral studies. Their use should be
closely examined in terms of the procedures used, the basis for their
conclusions, and the weight to be given them in general, and in the
particular situation.
By refusing to probe into the truth or falsity of campaign state-
ments in Shopping Kart, the Board has changed the law in the area
of misrepresentations during campaign elections."19 Yet, to be prac-
tical, the Board's approach must include protection for the employees'
exercise of their section 7 rights and for the Board's statutory obliga-
tions. As it now stands, the practical approach suggested by Shopping
Kart fails to sufficiently protect either the employees or the Board's
statutory obligations.
Patricia Anne Patterson
118. An objective standard could be provided to determine a lack of individual employee
sophistication. Information for such a determination could be provided by the employer when
he supplies the Excelsior list. For example, if a certain percentage of employees spoke little or
no English, or had minimum job experience and/or level of education, or if the level of unioni-
zation in the geographical area was low, the presumptions of sophistication by the Board would
be lacking. Such an election then could be categorized as requiring less to constitute a "material
misrepresentation.'"
119. See Thomas E. Gates and Sons, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 95 L.R.R.M. 1198 (May 17,
1977), (the Board reaffirmed Shopping Kart and declined to order a second election on the basis
of a misrepresentation by $1.90 of the existing wage under union's current contract, made during
the campaign by the Employer); Cormier Hosier Mills, 230 N.L.R.B. No. 185, 95 L.R.R. 1461
(July 21, 1977) (union misrepresentation that employer had engaged inintercorporate manipula-
tions by a two million dollar loan so as to prevent employees from sharing equitable in the
employer's profits, was not grounds for objections to the election since it did not fit within the
narrow exceptions to the Shopping Kart rule). See also regarding retroactivity of Shopping Kart,
Blackman-Uhler Chem. Div. v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1977), 96 L.R.R. 307 (4th Cir.
Sept. 12, 1977), (remanding a case involving campaign misrepresentations of employer's profits
by forty-eight percent to the Board for a determination of whether the Shopping Kart rule is
applicable to other pending decisions). But see Shalom Nursing Home, 230 N.L.R.B. No. 145,
95 L.R.R.M. 140 (July 19, 1977) (holding that where Shopping Kart decision, issued two days
after exceptions to the Hearing Officer's Report on Objections to the Election was due, so that
no exceptions to the recommendation that the objections to the misrepresentation be sustained
were received, the objection is overruled on the basis of Shopping Kart).
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